For more than three decades, the international community has leaned heavily on a predictable set of policy tools to curb global greenhouse gas emissions. From carbon pricing mechanisms and cap-and-trade systems to international offsets and non-binding emissions targets, the architecture of global climate governance has largely focused on what researchers describe as managing tons. Yet, as global temperatures continue to climb past critical thresholds—including the threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels—a growing body of scholars and policy experts is calling for a fundamental reckoning. Among the most prominent voices in this critical reassessment is Jessica Green, a political scientist at the University of Toronto and author of Existential Politics: Why Global Climate Institutions Are Failing and How to Fix Them.
Green’s core thesis challenges the foundational assumptions of modern climate policy. She argues that traditional market-based instruments like carbon pricing and offsets have failed to drive decarbonization at the required speed or scale. Worse, she contends that these mechanisms inadvertently preserve the existing socio-political systems that empower fossil fuel producers. In a wide-ranging interview with Corporate Knights managing editor Mark Mann, Green unpacks the systemic failures of landmark frameworks such as the Paris Agreement and the annual United Nations Climate Change Conferences, commonly known as COPs, while outlining an alternative path forward rooted in what she terms "radical pragmatism."
The Evolution and Breakdown of Global Climate Architecture
To understand the current state of climate policy, it is necessary to examine the historical trajectory of international environmental diplomacy. The modern climate governance regime formally began with the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The UNFCCC established a framework for international cooperation, which was subsequently supplemented by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol introduced legally binding emission reduction targets for developed nations, alongside flexible market mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism, which allowed countries to offset their emissions through projects in the developing world.
However, the architecture faced severe structural limitations from its inception. The United States notably refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and as subsequent commitment periods approached, several nations—including Canada—withdrew entirely. By the time the Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015, the international community shifted away from top-down, legally binding emission targets toward a bottom-up approach centered on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Under Paris, countries voluntarily pledged their own emission reduction goals, with the expectation that peer pressure and periodic reviews would drive ambition upward over time.
Nearly a decade after the signing of the Paris Agreement, evidence suggests that this voluntary model is buckling under its own weight. The submission process for updated NDCs has faced chronic delays, with numerous nations failing to meet deadlines or submitting plans that fall short of scientific imperatives. According to Green, the annual COP summits have grown so massive and bureaucratically complex—encompassing thousands of delegates, subcommittees, and corporate lobbyists—that meaningful participation and transparent accountability have become nearly impossible.
The Illusion of Market Mechanisms and Carbon Offsets
At the heart of Green’s critique is the persistent reliance on market-based mechanisms, specifically carbon pricing and offsets, which she argues have become a distraction from necessary structural interventions. For decades, economists have championed carbon pricing as the most economically efficient method to reduce emissions, operating on the theory that placing a financial cost on carbon pollution will naturally incentivize businesses and consumers to shift toward cleaner alternatives.
However, political realities have consistently undermined this theoretical model. In practice, governments rarely set carbon prices high enough to force rapid decarbonization because doing so immediately triggers severe political backlash from citizens and industries facing sudden cost-of-living increases. When the economic burden becomes politically unsustainable, governments are frequently forced to roll back or modify these policies, turning carbon pricing into a volatile partisan flashpoint rather than a stable pillar of environmental planning.
Furthermore, Green reserves sharp criticism for carbon offsets, which she describes as fundamentally flawed and susceptible to manipulation. The complexity of calculating emissions reductions across diverse projects—such as forestry conservation or renewable energy installations in developing countries—makes the verification of true additionality notoriously difficult. Offsets often provide large corporate emitters with political cover, allowing them to claim environmental stewardship while continuing to extract and burn fossil fuels, all while failing to deliver the substantial climate finance required by the Global South.
Shifting the Paradigm: Supply-Side Climate Policy and Radical Pragmatism
In place of demand-side market fixes, Green advocates for a fundamental shift toward supply-side policies. The prevailing liberal assumption of the energy transition has posited that if green technologies—such as electric vehicles, solar panels, and wind turbines—are made cheap enough, markets will naturally adopt them and phase out fossil fuels. Yet, empirical reality demonstrates that technological availability alone is insufficient. Despite the abundance of low-cost renewable energy potential, the global economy remains tethered to fossil fuels because the institutional structures created after the Second World War continue to protect and subsidize extraction.
Green points out that despite decades of G7 commitments—dating back to initial pledges in 2005—governments have largely failed to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies. Radical pragmatism, in her view, requires dismantling the privileges, legal protections, and political influence enjoyed by fossil fuel asset owners. Rather than attempting to negotiate the end of capitalism—which she dismisses as impractical given the narrow window of time remaining to address climate change—radical pragmatism utilizes existing state institutions and regulatory levers to make fossil fuel production significantly riskier and less profitable.
This approach aligns with a broader geopolitical shift. While climate policy was historically categorized as low politics—delegated primarily to environmental ministers and peripheral diplomatic channels—it is rapidly merging with high-stakes issues of national security, economic statecraft, and supply chain resilience. Governments are increasingly securing critical minerals, semiconductor technologies, and energy grids under the banner of industrial policy and national defense. While this transition is messy and often uncoordinated, it represents an inescapable structural reorganization of global economic power.
The Complex Dilemma of Carbon Removal and Corporate Accountability
As global emissions continue to outpace reductions, the international community has officially crossed the dangerous threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming. This reality has thrust carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies—ranging from enhanced rock weathering and direct air capture to large-scale sequestration—back to the forefront of climate policy discussions. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has made it clear that substantial residual emissions will require active removal from the atmosphere to stabilize global temperatures.
Yet, this introduces a profound governance dilemma: who should pay for, control, and implement these technologies? Climate leaders such as former UNFCCC executive secretary Christiana Figueres have argued that collaborating directly with the fossil fuel industry on transition solutions is a recipe for failure. Green shares this skepticism, warning that allowing private capital and legacy oil and gas corporations to dominate geoengineering and carbon removal creates a severe conflict of interest. When profit-driven entities are tasked with providing public goods, they frequently optimize systems for financial returns rather than ecological stability—a dynamic already visible in emerging, high-risk frontiers like deep-sea mining.
Broader Implications and the Path Forward
The transition away from fossil fuels is occurring simultaneously with deep economic anxiety among the global middle class, who are grappling with housing affordability, pension security, and an evolving economic landscape. Green argues that framing climate policy through narrow, hyper-technical lenses fails to connect with these broader societal pressures, alienating ordinary citizens and breeding political polarization.
Ultimately, navigating the next phase of the energy transition will require moving beyond the comforting illusion that complex carbon markets and voluntary targets alone can solve a structural political crisis. By confronting the entrenched political power of fossil capital, leveraging existing regulatory institutions, and addressing the deep distributive questions of asset ownership, policymakers can begin to implement the kind of systemic reset that science demands and global security requires.
